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The Court of Appeal decision in PC v City of York illustrates the complexity
inconsistency and limits of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) when applied to
decisions about intimate relationships. In commenting on the judgment - which held
that a woman with significant learning disabilities had the capacity to decide to cohabit
with her husband who posed a significant risk to her - we wish to make two main
observations. The first concerns how the MCA 2005 assesses capacity Although the
Court of Appeal wisely held that assessment of the capacity to decide to cohabit ought
to be 'person-specific', it set an overly stringent evidential requirement for establishing
incapacity This evidential stringency concerns both the connection between mental
impairment (MCA 2005, section 2) and inability to understand and use relevant
information (MCA 2005, section 3), and the way in which the Court interpreted the
expert evidence as 'outcome evidence'. The second observation concerns the human
right to protection from violence. Given the obligations under international law to
provide protection for vulnerable persons, and given the jurisdiction of the Court of
Protection to provide protection beyond the provisions in the MCA 2005, it is
extraordinary the Court of Appeal limited itself to the analysis of the MCA 2005 and
did not consider the use of the inherent jurisdiction. We shall first summarise the
decision before making our observations.
OVERVIEW
PC v City of York1 involved PC, a 48-year-old woman with significant learning
disabilities,2 who married NC whilst he was imprisoned for serious sexual offenses.
Given his history, it was accepted before the court that NC posed a serious risk to PC
if they were to cohabit.3 In anticipation of NC's release from prison, the relevant local
authority issued proceedings in the Court of Protection asserting that PC lacked the
capacity to cohabit with her husband. Hedley J (sitting as a judge of the Court of
Protection) agreed with the local authority.
Merton College, University of Oxford; ** Exeter College, University of Oxford.
[2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409.
2 She had an IQ measured at between 66 and 69.
3 [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [4].
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The judgment of the Court of Appeal sought to clarify two main legal issues with
regards to findings of incapacity under the MCA 2005, sections 2 and 3. These
statutory provisions state that:
'2 People who lack capacity
For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at
the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the
matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the
mind or brain.
3 Inability to make decisions
(1) For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself
if he is unable -
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision,
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the
decision ... '
The first main issue concerns whether a 'decision', to which sections 2 and 3 refer, is
an 'act-specific' or 'person-specific' decision, when it concerns cohabitation. Hedley J
had applied a 'person-specific' test which assessed whether PC has the ability to
understand the information relevant to the decision to cohabit with a particular person
(NC). The submission on behalf of PC was that an 'act-specific' test (which assesses
whether PC has the capacity to decide to cohabit as a general and non-specific act)
ought to have been applied. The argument was that the test for the capacity to marry
and the capacity to engage in sexual relations is an act-specific test4 and that 'there is
no warrant for adopting a person-specific approach to the assessment of capacity in
one context, but not the other'.5
The Court of Appeal nonetheless affirmed the person-specific approach of Hedley J.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, McFarlane U held that the determination of
capacity is 'decision-specific' since it is an evaluation of 'an individual's capacity to
make a decision for himself in relation to the matter. 6 In light of this, McFarlane U
reasoned that although some decisions (such as the decision to marry or divorce)
involve 'understanding matters of status, obligation and rights'7 and are thus status or
act specific, other decisions (such as decisions as to contact and residence) may be
person specific and 'may well be grounded in the specific factual context'.8 This
distinction between types of decisions, McFarlane U explained, reflects the distinction
between section 17 of the MCA 2005 (category of decisions, such as marriage, sexual
relations and divorce, that are exempt from the court's welfare jurisdiction once the
relevant incapacity is established) and section 27 (category of decisions, such as
cohabitation and contact, that are within the court's welfare jurisdiction).9 As a result,
4 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at paras [22]-[27]; Sheffield City Council v
E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), [2005] 1 FLR 965; Mv B, A and S (by Official Solicitor) [2005] EWHC 1681
(Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 117; A, B and C vX and Z [2012] EWHC 2400 (COP), [2013] COPLR 1; D Borough
Council vB [2011] EWHC 101 (COP), [2011] COPLR Con Vol 313; Local Authority Xv MM [2007] EWHC
2003 (Fam), [2009] 1 FLR 443. Although for criticism of this approach, see J Herring, 'Mental Disability
and Capacity to Consent to Sex' (2013) 34 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 471.
5 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [30].
6 Ibid, at para [37], emphasis added.
7 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [38].
8 Ibid, at para [37].
9 Ibid, at paras [35] and [38].
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the Court of Appeal affirmed that test under section 3(1)(a) as to whether PC has the
ability to 'understand the information relevant to the decision' must include 'reference
to information specifically relevant to NC in light of his conviction'. 10
This is an important acknowledgement by McFarlane U that a decision to marry
does not necessarily involve a decision to cohabit. As is widely accepted, the right to
consortium is no longer an incident of marriage and there could be no legal objection
to a marriage where the parties do not live together." This approach does reflect a
somewhat technical approach. The person on the street is likely to understand
marriage in a far broader sense than the lawyer and to understand marriage to be an
agreement to cohabit (or far more likely continue to cohabit). 12 Indeed it might be said
that, in effect, this decision undermines the practical significance of earlier case-law
holding that marriage is a 'status specific' test,13 because if a person wishes to live
with their spouse a 'person specific' test will be used.
The second main legal issue concerns the identification and weighting of evidence
that can satisfy the legal test under sections 2 and 3. It was submitted on behalf of PC
and NC that Hedley J failed to give sufficient weight to fact that 'PC has capacity in
every other area of her life, that PC has retained the capacity to marry, that PC has
extricated herself from unsatisfactory or harmful relationships on two previous
occasions and that PC had previously lived with NC for a year'.14 Moreover, it was
submitted that the evidence provided by an expert (Dr Payne) that concluded that PC
'lacked the capacity in relation to issues of deciding contact between herself and NC'15
was evidence that 'focused on the final content of the decisions' (outcome evidence)
rather than being 'functional evidence' of PC's inability to understand the nature and
effects of the decision. 16
The Court of Appeal agreed and sought to clarify the relationship between
sections 2 and 3. The Court was concerned that by moving from a finding of mental
impairment17 in section 2(1) to establishing an inability to make a decision in
section 3(1), 'the strength of the causative nexus between mental impairment and
inability to decide is watered down'." Instead, the MCA 2005 requires the reverse
approach: the inability to make a decision (in section 3(1)) must be because of the
mental impairment (in section 2(1)). Hedley J risked diluting the 'causal nexus' by
finding that PC's inability is 'referable to' or 'significantly relates to' PC's impairment.
More importantly (in terms of the appeal), the Court found that Hedley J did not
'spell out why' he concluded that PC's mental impairment meant she was unable to
understand and weigh the relevant information in relation to cohabitation, given PC's
10 Ibid, at para [39].
1 Consummation would be required if the marriage was not to be voidable: Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,
s 12.
12 See N Barker and M Fox, 'Sheffield City Council v E and J Herring, 'Commentary on Sheffield City
Council v E, in R Hunter, C McGlynn and E Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments (Hart Publishing, 2010)
who argue in favour of looking at the lived in reality of the marriage, rather than its legal obligations when
determining capacity to marry.
13 Eg, Sheffield City Council v E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), [2005] 1 FLR 965.
14 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [44].
15 Ibid, at para [7].
16 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at paras [46] and [59]; R v Cooper [2009]
UKHL 42, at para [13].
17 The term mental impairment is not in current professional use, but is the terminology used in the
legislation and so is used here.
1 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [58].
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capacity to make a series of other decisions. Although Hedley J relied upon the
evidence of Dr Payne, which concluded PC was unable to understand and weigh the
relevant information, the Court of Appeal found that evidence to be 'less than
reliable . . . because of the clear potential for [Dr Payne] to have focused upon the
"outcome" rather than PC's functional ability in general'. 19 As a result, Hedley J's
finding of incapacity was unsustainable. PC had capacity to decide to cohabit.
McFarlane U explained that despite the 'understandable professional concern':
'the structure and provisions of the MCA 2005 are to be applied with clarity and
care in order to ensure that the autonomy of the individual is not eroded by the
court in a case which, in reality, does not come within the statutory provisions.'20
The appeal was therefore allowed. This commentary will analyse two main aspects of
the decision. First, the analysis of capacity under the MCA 2005, and secondly, the
conclusion that - as the case fell outside the MCA 2005 - PC had to be allowed to
cohabit.
1. THE ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY
Person-specific decisions
The primary question of law in the appeal concerned whether information that
specifically pertains to NC is 'relevant information' for the purposes of section 3(1). As
McFarlane U explained, in some contexts (such as marriage) the decision-specific
approach may be limited to an act-specific assessment, otherwise a decision-specific
approach under the MCA 2005 requires a grounding in the specific (and full) factual
context.21 McFarlane U also held that, in the context of a decision to co-habit, the
assessment necessitates a grounding in the factual context that includes
person-specific information. The need for a person-specific assessment, in the context
of a decision to co-habit, is explained - perhaps opaquely - at two points in the
judgment:
'without grounding the decision in the particular factual context, the question of
capacity does not gain any traction and is effectively meaningless.'22
'the effect that removing the specific factual context from some decisions leaves
nothing for the evaluation of capacity to bite upon.' 2 3
We find this a convincing analysis, but need to explain why we will unpack the claim
that these metaphors of 'traction' and 'bite' are conveying. It is this claim, coupled with
the Court's interpretation of the MCA 2005, that provides the basis for the
person-specific approach to the assessment of capacity to co-habit.
The law values the capacity to make a decision. The capacity to reason is what
connects our decisions and actions with our responsibility for our decisions and
actions. The law considers each person to be responsible for the consequences of
their actions because it assumes that each action that a person performs follows from
19 Ibid, at para [59].
20 Ibid, at para [51].
21 Ibid, at para [38].
22 Ibid, at para [31].
23 Ibid, at para [35].
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a deliberation by that person about the consequences of their actions. 24 The capacity
to reason is also what connects our liberty to act in accordance with our own decisions
with the responsibility of others not to interfere with our decisions and actions. The law
refrains from interfering in the decisions of others because it respects each person's
own deliberation as to the consequences of their own actions. Our decisions,
therefore, attract responsibility and liberty when they are deliberative decisions.25 The
corollary is that where someone's capacity to reason is impaired, their responsibility for
their decisions and actions is diminished, and equally, our responsibility not to interfere
with their decisions and actions also dissolves.26
Since decisions that attract responsibility and liberty are decisions that deliberate as
to the consequences of actions, an assessment of whether someone has the legal
capacity to make a decision must be an assessment of whether the individual is able to
deliberate as to the effect and consequences of the decision. Hence, the MCA 2005
sets out an assessment of capacity that includes an assessment of a person's ability
to (s 3(1)(a)) understand the information relevant to the decision, to (s 3(1)(b)) retain
the information, and ( s3(1)(c)) to use or weigh that information as part of the process
of making the decision.
Yet, different decisions will have different features, effects and consequences.
Decisions as to residency, care, medical treatment, contact, sexual relations, financial
arrangements, marriage and co-habitation are different types of decisions, such that
each concerns a different kaleidoscope of consequences. For instance, the decision to
enter a contract to mortgage a house or buy a car has the effect of changing the
parties' legal rights and obligations, and their property interests. Perhaps
controversially, the decision to marry was described as a decision to enter into a
marriage contract that (only) has the effect of changing the legal status of the parties
to the marriage and affixing certain legal rights and obligations.27 The decision to
receive medical treatment, in contrast, is a decision about bodily intrusion, side-effects
and health risks, and chances of successful treatment of a medical condition. A
decision that attracts responsibility and liberty is a decision that is deliberative as to the
particular set of effects and consequences. It must, therefore, be shown that the
decision maker has sufficient understanding of the particular considerations relevant to
the specific decision.
As the judgment in PC v City of York highlights, there are differing approaches to
what set of effects and consequences are relevant to the assessment of capacity. One
approach is to include the 'nature and effects' of an action that are true of the action in
all circumstances or all instances of the action. In other words, the action-specific
consequences of the decision. For instance, Hedley J in A Local Authority v H2 8 held
that for someone to make a decision about sexual relations it is necessary for them to
understand the 'mechanics of the physical acts', 'that vaginal intercourse may lead to
pregnancy', 'some grasp of sexual health' and understand that he or she has a choice
24 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 itself treats as lacking capacity those who do not have the capacity to
make a decision. A person who has the capacity but does not use it is not covered by the Act.
25 There is abundant literature on the importance and nature of capacity. A helpful recent contribution is
M Donnelly, 'Best interests, patient participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005' (2009) 17 Medical
Law Review 1.
26 Of course, whether the law should make these assumptions about someone's decisions is contentious.
See, eg G Stanghellini and R Rosfort, Emotions and Personhood (OUP, 2013), ch 1, questioning the
place of rationality in matters of responsibility.
27 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [38].
28 [2012] EWHC 49 (COP), [2012] COPLR 305.
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whether or not to engage in sexual relations.29 These are the features of the action and
consequences of the action that follow from a decision to engage in sexual relations in
all instances of sexual relations. It is not necessary, according to Hedley J in A Local
Authority v H, for the individual to understand any moral or emotional component of the
nature and effect of sexual relations. 30 Since 'different sexual acts will have different
meanings in different contexts', 31 there will be emotional and moral consequences of
sexual relations in some, but not all, circumstances. Or at least there will be different
emotional and moral consequences in different contexts.
The competing approach is to consider the effects and consequences of an action in
the particular circumstances of the decision. Under such an approach, the assessment
includes the full set of decision-specific consequences. As we have seen, this was the
approach taken by the Court of Appeal that includes in the assessment of capacity the
effects and consequences of engaging in an activity with a particular person (ie
cohabitation with NC).
Crucially, the Court considered that an assessment that excluded person-specific
information would be an 'effectively meaningless' assessment. If the assessment of
the capacity to decide to co-habit was limited to information about the co-habitation
that is true in all instances of co-habitation, then there would be no (or very little)
information that the decision maker would need to understand, retain and weigh. It
would not be possible, for instance, to draw up for cohabitation a list of the features of
the kind Hedley J did for sexual intercourse.
Since there is no (or very little) 'relevant information' for the decision maker to
deliberate upon, there is nothing (or very little) for the Court to base their assessment
of capacity on. As a result, as McFarlane LJ put it, the question of capacity has no
'traction' or nothing to 'bite on'. This is a problem because the decision to cohabit is
clearly a significant one, attracting significant consequences for the individual. The
legislation would be failing in its aims if capacity to make such a major decision could
be found by someone who understood effectively nothing. It was therefore necessary
and entirely appropriate for the Court of Appeal to take a person-specific approach to
the assessment of the capacity to co-habit.32
The finding of lack of capacity
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal against Hedley J's
judgment, identified two problems with it. These will be explored further.
The stringency of the nexus
The first concern was that Hedley J had diluted the nexus between the mental
impairment and the inability to understand and use the relevant information. A person
who has a mental impairment, who fails to understand a matter relevant to a decision
not because of their mental impairment but for some other reason, will not be found to
lack capacity. While McFarlane LJ did not speculate, it might, for example, have been
PC's love of NC, rather than her learning disability, which clouded her understanding of
the truth. Had that been so she would not have lacked capacity under the MCA 2005.
29 Ibid, at paras [23] and [25]; criticised in J Herring, 'Mental disability and capacity to consent to sex' (2013)
34 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 471.
30 A Local Authority v H [2012] EWHC 49 (COP), [2012] COPLR 305, at paras [20] and [24].
31 J Herring, 'Mistaken sex' [2005] Criminal Law Review 511.
32 Indeed, arguably, the fact that the Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 27 excludes the power to make certain
intimate decisions for a person lacking capacity, such as the decision to marry, is a recognition that some
decisions are too personal for someone to make on behalf of someone else.
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The problem is that it is very difficult to know precisely why it is a particular person
does not know a relevant fact. Learning disability, for example, can be associated with
emotional immaturity and lack of insight.33 Isolating the particular aspect of PC's
personhood that led her not to understand NC is incredibly complex. This is especially
so in decisions about intimate lives. Could someone with capacity explain why they
love someone? The root of such feelings or perceptions about another is hard to
discover in those with full capacity, let alone someone of questionable capacity.
Perhaps the best one could do in this case would be to ask whether if PC did not have
a learning disability would she have wanted to cohabit with NC? That seems
remarkably speculative. A preferable approach may be to hold that where an individual
suffers an impairment of mental functioning and also fails to understand a fact relevant
to their decision it is assumed that the failure to understand results from the mental
functioning, unless there is a clear reason why it does not. However, the Court seems,
by implication, to have rejected an approach based on such a presumption. We
suggest that further consideration be given to the use of presumptions on that
question. Our suggestions are reinforced by the issue we consider next, which is the
kind of evidence which can be used to establish the lack of person-specific capacity in
this case.
The use of 'outcome evidence'
The second concern that underlies the Court of Appeal's conclusion that a finding of
incapacity could not be sustained is the concern that the evidence of incapacity was
'outcome evidence'. To sustain the finding of PC's incapacity, the Court of Appeal held
that there must be evidence of PC's inability to understand the nature and effects of
her decision to cohabit and/or the inability to use that information (functional evidence).
It stated that the evidence relied upon by Hedley J was 'less than reliable' because it
may have 'focused on the final content of the decision', rather than using functional
evidence.34
The difficulty is that the reasoning process that leads to a decision - the
understanding and weighing of information - is an internal process that is not directly
observable. We can, nonetheless, make inferences from observable facts about
someone's reasoning process. For instance, it is available to us to infer from the fact
PC had 'extricated herself from unsatisfactory or harmful relationships on two previous
occasions' that PC has in some contexts the ability to understand the nature and
effects of cohabiting relationships, weigh this information and decide to remove herself
from relationships.
Yet, at best we can say that there is evidence of PC's capacity to understand and
weigh information about cohabiting relationships in general. We cannot know, without
looking at the content of the decision whether she exercised her potential capacity in
the case at hand. When we consider the specific decision, it is often difficult to avoid
the 'unreliable' approach taken by Dr Payne, who considered that the 'most important
issue . . . was that PC could not, or would not, accept the guilt, or even the possible
guilt, of NC in respect of the matters of which he had been convicted'. For Dr Payne,
this 'demonstrated that [PC] was incapable of understanding the information relevant
to her decision to have contact with him, or to weigh matters in relation to that
33 C Farnstone and D Thomspon, 'People with learning disabilities, sex and the law', in M McCarthy and
D Thompson (eds), Sexuality and Learning Disabilities (Pavilion, 2010).
* PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [59].
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decision'. 35 Any evidence, that pertains to the specific decision, will inevitably be
evidence about someone's internal reasoning process based upon inferences from the
context, which must include the content of the final decision. There is often no other
evidence one can use.36
There are two ways of presenting the argument against the Court of Appeal's
criticism of Dr Payne's evidence. First, that it was wrong to characterise his evidence
as simply outcome evidence. The Court of Appeal was right to agree with Baroness
Hale 37 that evidence that is focused on the 'final content of the decision' is not to be
taken into account insofar as the content of the decision is assessed against
'conventional values'. 38 However, if the MCA 2005 requires a decision-specific
assessment, then any possible evidence will necessarily be in reference to the final
content of the decision. Our suggestion here is that the Court of Appeal
mischaracterised the functional evidence provided by Dr Payne as outcome evidence
since the evidence (unavoidably) referred to the specifics and content of the decision.
Secondly, even if Dr Payne's evidence is outcome evidence there is nothing wrong
with using that. That is clear from the statute itself. Sub-section 4(1) states:
A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he
makes an unwise decision.'
Notice the use of the word 'merely' here. The sub-section is not prohibiting the use of
evidence that refers to the content of the decision, it is simply saying one should not
automatically assume that a person whose decision is unwise is, therefore, lacking
capacity. There is no objection to someone using evidence that refers to the content of
the decision, along with other evidence to make an assessment of capacity 3 9
Before leaving this issue it is interesting to note that no reference is made in the
judgment of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
As Peter Bartlett has pointed out there are interesting debates to be had over whether
the test for capacity in the Mental Capacity Act breaches the rights protected by the
convention.40 There is not room to discuss that further here, but future cases may
helpfully address the issue.
2. THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF PROTECTION AND THE
DUTY TO PROTECT
This decision, we suggest, fails to take adequate account of the UK's obligations under
the Istanbul Convention and the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR). These create a duty on the state to
protect citizens from abuse from others. We will start by outlining those duties.
35 Ibid, at para [7].
36 It is not impossible to imagine a particular physical reaction during a decision-making, such as severe
shaking, indicating a mental disorder was impacting the decision-making process, but rarely will such
direct evidence be availiable.
37 R v Cooper [2009] UKHL 42, at para [13].
38 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [46].
39 Department of Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act: Code of Practice (TSO, 2007), para 2.7. See
P Bartlett, Blackstone's Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2008).
40 P Bartlett, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health
Law' (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 752.
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The Istanbul Convention
On 8 June 2012 the UK signed the 'Istanbul Convention': The Council of Europe
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic
violence. Under Article 4(1):
'Parties shall take the necessary legislative and other measures to promote and
protect the right for everyone, particularly women, to live free from violence in
both the public and the private sphere.'
This obligation requires the state to protect women from violence from non-state
actors:
'Parties shall take the necessary legislative and other measures to exercise due
diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and provide reparation for acts of
violence covered by the scope of this Convention that are perpetrated by
non-State actors.'4 1
Further Article 18(1) states:
'Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect all
victims from any further acts of violence.'4 2
Crucially the services required under Article 18 'shall not depend on the victim's
willingness to press charges or testify against any perpetrator'.
These provisions give some meat to the obligations that were already established in
the case-law under the ECHR. Article 2, protecting the right to life; Article 3 providing
protection from torture and degrading treatment and Article 8, protecting the right to
respect for private life; all create positive obligations on the state. This means that not
only must the state not infringe these rights it is required to take positive steps to
prevent one citizen from infringing the rights of the other.
The obligation under the convention extends to taking specific measures to protect
an individual whose life is at risk at the hands of another.43 In Opuz v Turkey
(discussing the right to life) it was explained:
'For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew
or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk
to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that
they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.'4 4
That obligation must be interpreted so that the burden on the state is not
disproportionate or impossible.45
A state will infringe an individual's right under Article 3 if it is aware that she or he is
suffering serious abuse at the hands of another and fails to take reasonable 46 or
41 Article 5(2).
42 Article 18(1).
43 Osman v the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports 1998-VIll.
4 Opuz v Turkey [2009] ECHR 33401/02, at para 129.
45 M. Burton, 'The human rights of victims of domestic violence: Opuz v Turkey [201] CFLQ 131.
46 Z v UK [2001] 2 FLR 612.
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adequate47 or effective48 steps to protect that individual.49 There is a particular
obligation on the state to protect the Article 3 rights of vulnerable people.50 The
obligations can extent to intervene and remove a victim from a position where she or
he is suffering conduct which is prohibited by Article 3.51 Hence states have been
found to infringe Article 3 when they have been aware that children are being abused
but have not taken steps to protect them. 52
The right under Article 3 is an absolute one.5 3 Unlike many of the other rights
mentioned in the ECHR there are no circumstances in which it is permissible for the
state to infringe this right. This makes it clear that the rights of another party cannot
justify an infringement of someone's Article 3 rights. So, for example, it cannot be
successfully argued that a family's right of privacy justifies non-intervention by the
state if that non-intervention is an infringement of one family member's Article 3 rights.
Indeed, even other rights of the victim cannot justify an infringement of Article 3. In
other words, the state cannot justify its failure to protect a victim's Article 3 rights by
referring to that person's right to respect for private life.5 4
Like Article 3, Article 8 has been interpreted to mean that not only must the state not
infringe someone's bodily or psychological integrity, but also the state must ensure that
one person's integrity is not interfered with at the hands of another. In other words it is
not just a 'negative right' inhibiting state intrusion into citizen's private lives, it places
'positive obligations' on the state to intervene to protect individuals.55 However, unlike
Article 3, this is a qualified right. It is permissible for the state to fail to respect an
individual's right to respect for private life under Article 8(1) if paragraph 2 is satisfied.
So, if the level of abuse is not sufficient to engage Article 3 but falls within Article 8
then it is necessary to balance the Article 8 rights and interests of other parties. It
would therefore be possible to make an argument that the rights of the abuser, or
perhaps even the victim, justify the state in not intervening in an Article 8 case.
Applying these principles in this case
The first point to note is the complete absence of any consideration of the positive duty
on the state to protect PC in this case. Remarkably, there is no discussion of her
human rights of protection nor of the heightened obligation of the state to protect her,
given her vulnerable status. While the Court is not obliged to give effect to international
conventions signed by the Government, it is required under section 6 of the Human
Rights Act 1998 as a public authority to act in accordance with an individual's
Convention rights.
What would have been said had the court considered the human rights obligations in
this case? First, PC is a vulnerable adult with significant learning disabilities.56
Therefore there are heightened obligations owed towards her.
47 A v UK [1998] 2 FLR 959, at para 24.
48 Z v UK [2001] 2 FLR 612, at para 73.
49 E v UK [2003] 1 FLR 348.
50 A v UK [1998] 2 FLR 959, at para 20.
51 See S Choudhry and J Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (Hart Publishing, 2010), chs 8
and 9.
52 E v UK [2003] 1 FLR 348.
53 M Addo and N Grief, 'Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrine absolute
rights?' (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 510.
54 Although the state may argue that the victim's views make it unreasonable for the state to intervene.
55 S Choudhry and J Herring, 'Domestic violence and the Human Rights Act 1998: A new means of legal
intervention' [2007] Public Law 752.
56 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [1].
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Secondly, the local authority and the court were aware that NC posed a current real
risk to PC. They knew NC had been convicted of serious sexual offences. He has not
received any therapy or treatment. These sexual offences were committed against his
previous wives. Although it was accepted that NC had not to date done serious harm to
PC he did 'pose a serious risk to PC in her capacity as a cohabiting wife'.57 Indeed:
Looked at objectively, through the eyes of experienced professionals, NC clearly
presents a significant risk to any woman who enters a close relationship with him.
Moreover, any professional understanding will include knowledge of the usual modus
operandi of such offenders who may be expected to embark upon a lengthy period of
'grooming' before exhibiting any overtly abusive behaviour. In that context PC's
previous experience of living with NC might be seen to be of limited value; indeed
some professionals may well anticipate that NC would have behaved well during the
previous period of cohabitation. There is therefore an understandable and justified
professional concern to protect a potentially vulnerable woman who has formed a
close relationship with NC.58
All the factors seem to point in favour of the state and the court owing an obligation
to protect PC. There is a real risk of her rights under international law being infringed;
she is vulnerable; and the public authorities are aware of the dangers. But two
problems appear to have inhibited the court. The first is that the court assumed that
having found that PC had capacity to make the decision to cohabit the court could not
intervene. While as McFarlane LJ was quite right to say an order under MCA 2005
cannot be made where a person is found to have capacity, the court still has the power
under the inherent jurisdiction to make an order to protect vulnerable adults even
where they have capacity.
In DL vA Local Authority59 the Court of Appeal was clear:
'... the inherent jurisdiction remains available for use in cases to which it may
apply that fall outside the MCA 2005 is not merely arrived at on the negative basis
that the words of the statute are self-limiting and there is no reference within it to
the inherent jurisdiction. There is, in my view, a sound and strong public policy
justification for this to be so. The existence of "elder abuse", as described by
Professor Williams, is sadly all too easy to contemplate. Indeed the use of the
term "elder" in that label may inadvertently limit it to a particular age group
whereas, as the cases demonstrate, the will of a vulnerable adult of any age may,
in certain circumstances, be overborne. Where the facts justify it, such individuals
require and deserve the protection of the authorities and the law so that they may
regain the very autonomy that the appellant rightly prizes.' 60
The Court of Appeal did not want to limit the ambit of the jurisdiction by producing a
definition of the vulnerable adults caught by the jurisdiction, but it was stated to apply
to those who, even if competent under the MCA 2005, had 'borderline lack of
capacity'.61 PC clearly fell within this category.
57 Ibid, at para [3].
58 Ibid, at para [50].
59 [2012] EWCA Civ 253, [2012] COPLR 504.
60 DL vA Local Authority [2012] EWCA Civ 253, [2012] COPLR 504, at para [63].
61 Ibid, at para [62]. See also Dr A v NHS Trust [2013] EWHC 2442 (COP), [2013] COPLR (forthcoming).
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There was, therefore, no doubt the court had the jurisdiction under the inherent
jurisdiction to protect PC, even given that she had capacity for the purposes of the
MCA 2005. Extraordinarily this jurisdiction is not mentioned by the Court of Appeal.
McFarlane LJ states:
'There may be many women who are seen to be in relationships with men
regarded by professionals as predatory sexual offenders. The Court of Protection
does not have jurisdiction to act to "protect" these women if they do not lack the
mental capacity to decide whether or not to be, or continue to be, in such a
relationship . . . The statute respects their autonomy so to decide and the Court
of Protection has no jurisdiction to intervene.'62
Yet in DL 6 3 McFarlane LJ himself acknowledged precisely the existence of such a
jurisdiction.
Leaving the jurisdictional issue to one side. What about the claims of principle?
Lewison LJ states:
'adult autonomy is such that people are free to make unwise decisions, provided
that they have the capacity to decide.'64
The weight to be attached to autonomy is too big a question to be addressed in this
commentary. We will make four brief points. First, it seems odd to rely on autonomy
given that PC lacked understanding of a key piece of information and therefore lacked
the ability to make an autonomous decision. Even though the court found that there
was no evidence that her lack of understanding was not the result of a mental disorder,
that does not detract from the fact the decision was based on false information and
therefore lacking a central pre-condition to be an autonomous decision, namely that a
person understood the key relevant facts.65 Secondly, as outlined above, there are
limits to autonomy 66 A person cannot under Article 3 consent to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment. So, even if PC was autonomously consenting to enter a violent
relationship, autonomy may not have permitted her to do that. Thirdly, as the Court of
Appeal in DL pointed out, where a person's capacity to make a decision is impaired
they may need the protection of the law to enable them to regain and maximise their
autonomy. Fourthly, while autonomy deserves significant protection it must be balanced
against other interests, especially where the exercise of autonomy is impaired. Some
might say that leaving PC to what is expected tobe a life of sexual abuse and domestic
violence is justified in a case where a person has made a fully autonomous decision.
But where that is made by a person of an IQ lower than 70, in a vulnerable state,
autonomy cannot, we suggest, do that much work.
CONCLUSION
Lewison LJ concluded his judgment with the comment that:
62 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [52].
63 [2012] EWCA Civ 253, [2012] COPLR 504.
64 Ibid, at para [64].
65 As P Bartlett, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental
Health Law' (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 752 argues the requirement of a mental impairment could be
seen as a breach of the Convention on the Rights of Person with Disabilities.
66 Examples include the protection afforded by the Mental Health Act 1983.
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'We must leave PC free to make her own decision, and hope that everything turns
out well in the end.' 67
We have taken a less sanguine view and believe the Court of Appeal failed to protect
PC's human rights. The court's analysis started off with a welcome recognition that the
capacity to cohabit is person specific. But then, we respectfully suggest, took three
wrong turns. First, it mischaracterised the expert evidence as outcome evidence simply
on the basis that it referred to the final content of the decision. Secondly, it required
that the evidence prove or establish that the ability to understand and use information
relevant to the decision was because of a mental impairment. This evidential approach
places an impossible burden on those seeking to assess capacity Thirdly, it failed to
recognise the significance of PC's human rights to protection and the availability of the
inherent jurisdiction to protect vulnerable adults.
67 PC v City of York [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2013] COPLR 409, at para [64].
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